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Abstract— The Cyber Security is a crucial aspect of networks 
management. The Reachability Matrix computation is one of the 
main challenge in this field. This paper presents an intelligent 
solution in order to address the Reachability Matrix 
computational problem.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 In this paper we describe our contribute in the 
PANOPTESEC
1
 project. PANOPTESEC aims to deliver 
beyond-state-of-the-art prototype of a cyber defence decision 
support system, demonstrating the benefit of a risk based 
approach to automated cyber defence. PANOPTESEC takes 
into account of the dynamic nature of information and 
communications technologies (ICT) and of the constantly 
evolving capabilities of cyber attackers in order to propose a 
solution based on knowledge representation and reasoning.  
 Recently, various studies provided progress in the Cyber 
Defence domain with data models and methods to focus the 
security problem in large networks. Morin et al. [1] have 
provided “a data model for security systems to query and 
assert knowledge about security incidents and the context in 
which they occur”. “This model constitutes a consistent and 
formal that an organization implements with an ICT system. 
 In order to better assess the effect of countermeasures to 
cyber-attacks and better rank countermeasures, 
PANOPTESEC provides a list of requirements for a system 
for mission impact assessment. Information about ICT assets 
and their vulnerabilities is used in order to compute known 
ways to aattack a system (so-called attack graphs). 
Reachability Matrix is the input for the Attack Graph 
Generator.  ground to represent information”[1]. The 
PANOPTESEC approach to cyber-security maintenance 
support is based on a model of relations between business 
services and the supporting ICT assets. Business services 
represent the mission assessment. Information about ICT 
assets and their vulnerabilities is used in order to compute 
known ways to attack a system (so-called attack graphs). 
Reachability Matrix is the input for the Attack Graph 
Generator.  ground to represent information”[1]. 
 The scope of this paper encompasses data collection and 
correlation for the ACEA use case, but also provides a 
generalized approach for cyber security domain.  We propose 
a semantic approach that applying the formalism of 
Description Logics [1] to the Cyber Security domain.  
 Following we describe the Reachability Matrix Correlator 
(RMC) component, the Reachability Matrix Ontology (RMO) 
and the reasoning task. RMC provides algorithms for 
computing reachability information. RMO describes the Cyber 
Security domain. Reasoning task uses the RMO ontology in 
order to compute the Reachability Matrix. Our approach 
foresees that RMC populates the RMO with input data 
provided by PANOPTESEC Data Collection and Correlation 
system (see section II and III for more details) and applies a 
set of SWRL rules and SPARQL queries to compute the 
Reachability Matrix (see section IV for more details). 
Reachability Matrix is employed in PANOPTESEC to 
determine if a node can reach another node (via ISO/OSI layer 
protocols), this information is crucial to risk management. 
II. REACHABILITY MATRIX CORRELATOR  
As shown in Figure 1 the PANOPTESEC architecture  
includes: Visualization System, data Collection and 
Correlation System, Dynamic Risk Management System, 
Integration Framework and Monitored System. The Data 
Collection and Correlation System (DCC) has the goal of 
providing suitable data to all other components required for 
building a cyber-security protection system. The Reachability 
Matrix Correlator component is part of the Data Collection 
and Correlation System. 
The role of DCC in the PANOPTESEC project is to 
develop a data collection and a correlation engine for building 
an advanced cyber-security maintenance system. The Data 
Collection and Correlation System, which also contains a 
model for describing the impact of cyber-attacks as well as 
corresponding countermeasures (based on a mission model), 
will provide the necessary input for other components of 
PANOPTESEC. DCC is composed by five main components: 
Data Collection Interface, Data Collection Collector, Low-
Level Correlator,  Reachability Matrix Correlator and Mission 
Impact Module (see Figure 1). The DCC module needs to 
avoid duplicate data handling and complex synchronization 
principles. RMC provides the reachability matrix, useful for 
the Attack Graph Generation component of the Dynamic Risk 
Management Response System. The reachability information 
are used to determine if a node can reach another node (via 
ISO/OSI layer protocols). 
 
  RMC  performs the reachability computation across the 
monitored ICT network to deduct if two nodes are reachable 
from each other in the network, for all pairs of nodes 
representing ICT devices. To achieve the RMC goal we need  
to produce an abstract machine-readable representation of the 
knowledge, the RMO (see next section for details). As shown 
in Figure 2 RMO is imported from an external file and stored 
in the Graph Database Sesame [2] by the T-Box Loader, this 
operation happens once at the initialization of the RMC and 
successively only if RMO is changed. Then A-Box Loader  
populates the RMO with the information regarding the 
Network Inventory, Deploy Access Control Policy and 
Mitigation Action. Finally the reachability correlation engine 
computes the Reachability Matrix using information stored 
into Knowledge Base. 
The RMC must:  
- determine if a node is reachable from another node on 
a logical level. To provide at a logical level if a node 
can be reached from another node If in a network a 
node is reachable from another node, there is a 
possibility that an adversary might be able to infiltrate 
a network further. Such information is gatherable 
from, e.g., Firewall Rules, Mapping Rules, Firewall 
Logs and/or Traffic Captures. 
- determine reachability in terms of Source-Port, 
Target-Port, Protocol To obtain a detailed view 
of reachability in a network and provide the most 
available information If a node is reachable over 
a specific port and protocol, there might exist 
vulnerabilities in such a protocol. Further a node 
might be reachable, but this reachability does not 
allow an adversary to progress further in a network. 
- identify physical entities responsible for a 
reachability. Identify hardware entities, e.g. 
Firewalls, Switches, Routers, that route a reachability 
on a physical level. A logically non-existing 
hardware, e.g. a switch, but itself be prone to 
vulnerabilities, which might allow an adversary to 
broaden a reachability. 
- consider that a node might be known via multiple 
addresses To identify a reachability on a logical level 
between unique devices In a subnetwork, entities 
might be addressed (e.g. IP) in another way, than from 
outside the subnetwork. 
The requirements presented are secondary to: 
a) Identifying and defining an adequate representation 
of knowledge (ontology), the proper Knowledge Base and the 
appropriate Knowledge Repository [2] to store the Knowledge 
Base,   
 b) Defining a proper mode to populate the Knowledge 
Base. 
Several tasks are needed to achieve the RMC goal:  
a) To study and produce a correct representation of the 
problem, using the most suitable available methods. 
b) To perform applied research to determine the 
optimum methods to solve automatically the problem. 
c) To guarantee that the representation of the 
knowledge, the representation of the problem and the solving 
method are abstract enough to be independent of any specific 
commercial networking devices or applications. 
d) To integrate the available tools and methods into a 
running prototype correlator that produces the correct 
Reachability Matrix. 
Figure 1: PANOPTESEC global architecture and logical data flows. 
 e) To guarantee that the IT services provided by the 
Correlator are be aligned to the needs of the Attack Graph 
Generation component of the Dynamic Risk Management 
Response System . 
f) To guarantee the compatibility of the technical 
solution with the overall PANOPTESEC system 
g) To guarantee that the technical implementation of the 
solution within PANOPTESEC system is performing at an 
acceptable service level for a prototype within the project 
scope and quality requirements. 
III. THE KNOWLEDGE BASE 
As mentioned above RMO ontology [3] represents 
connectivity, Network Inventory, Access Control Policy and 
Mitigation Actions. RMO has  the following characteristics: 
• Capable of representing all kind of ICT devices, 
including terminal machines, 
•  Able to represent connectivity including sub-netting,  
• Able to describe ICT devices grouping, according to 
filtering rules in machines, 
• Capable of representing gateways and firewalling 
rules, 
• Having the capacity to represent connectivity 
between every kind of nodes in the ICT network, 
• Able to represent Deployed Access Control Policy 
Rules, 
• Able to represent Deployed Mitigation Actions. 
In order to design  RMO used within the RMC component, 
we faced a thorough and deep study of IP networks in order to 
identify all objects that come into play in such a domain, with 
all their characteristics, the relationships between them, and 
the role each element plays in successful communications over 
IP networks. This study has gone in parallel with the analysis 
of the Data Model that we have been provided with, with 
special regards for the schemas concerning the Network 
Inventory and the Deployed Access Policies (which are 
basically the format of the data incoming into our component 
as its input), and the schema for the Reachability Matrix which 
determines the format for the data that exits our component. 
The resulting knowledge representation, which is an OWL 
[4] ontology, provides a reconciled vision of these partial Data 
Models, in such a way that the ontology has “room” enough to 
receive all data from Network Inventory (and the other input 
files about routing tables, firewall rules and NAT rules) so as 
to compose a Knowledge Base (static T-box, plus the A-box 
reloaded over time), and to re-model the data so as to fit the 
output data format required by the Reachability Matrix data 
model. Of course, input and output formats described in the It 
Data Model do overlap, since are different views of the same 
matter. More precisely, the output that we produce contains a 
subset of all the information which is in the input that we 
receive, but enriched with some “new” information. 
 This is the information made explicit by automatic 
reasoning, thanks to the “logical embedding” of the additional 
knowledge about the functioning of IP networks (derived from 
our initial study) that is recorded in the ontology (in particular 
in the T-box). While designing the ontology, the classes 
described in the Data Model schemas, with all their attributes, 
needed to be re-modelled to fit the different representation 
paradigm of ontologies. The most typical cause of intervention 
is the need to distinguish objects - and their relationships with 
other objects (possibly with different types of objects) - from 
Figure 2: Component View: Reachability Matrix Correlator (Internal Blocks Diagram) 
 simple values that express attributes of the objects (sort of 
terminal, minimal points of information about which is not 
possible to say anything else). Briefly, at the present stage of 
development, the ontology has an expressivity well within 
OWL-DL [4] expressivity (allowing for good performance of 
reasoning). It counts with 37 named classes (i.e. concepts in 
the ontology T-box) that collect the objects accounted for in 
the Network Inventory and the other input files. There also 37 
different relationships (object properties according to the 
OWL terminology) to represent the possible relationships 
among the objects of this classes, and other 55 (datatype) 
properties to account for all other characteristics of the 
objects.  
The most important part for the function of our module 
(which at present is focused on reachability at the layer 3 of 
the OSI model) is the part that accounts for: nodes 
identification, network interfaces, network they belong to, and 
routing instructions to reach other networks, i.e. the routes and 
the complex information to describe them: the source 
(node&interface), the destination (network), and the gateway 
to pass through. Besides the classes that collect the objects of 
these various types, a set of 12 object properties allow to 
logically model the reachability between nodes. These (object) 
properties deal with: 
- the network interfaces belonging to some node 
- the network that each interface is connected to 
- and, as a consequence, the networks that a node 
belongs to. 
But also they deal with the other networks that can be 
reached by passing through one or more gateways, based on 
routing instructions. Finally, a set of 4 SWRL [5] (Semantic 
Web Rule Language) rules “force” the reasoner [6] to 
compute, for every interface of a node, every other node it can 
reach to (further details on this regard in the next section). 
IV. ABOUT THE REASONING 
The very first reasoning service used with regard to our 
ontology is the consistency check of the T-box, which is run at 
the design time of the ontology. Of course, the ontology 
passed this check. Subsequent check is the validation of the 
entire knowledged base. Once the A-box is loaded along with 
the T-box, and the whole KB is loaded into the framework of 
our component, this second service checks whether the A-box 
– produced based on the input data (Network Inventory and 
other files) – is consistent with respect to the T-box. Normally, 
a fail in this check would highlight an error in the way the 
input data is translated into the A-box, hence still an error in 
the ontology design. 
 The most interesting part is the reasoning triggered by the 
SWRL rules  that rely on information stored in the Knowledge 
Base. These rules are typical logical rules of the form:  
IF condition1 and … conditionN THEN consequence. 
 The rules provided along with our ontology describe 
all possible scenarios to be investigated in order to detect all 
the nodes that are reachable from any given couple made of a 
node (with its specific routing instructions) and any of its 
network interfaces (connected each to one particular network).  
 The first rule covers the case of all reachable nodes within 
the same domain to which a given node belongs. The second 
rule covers the case of all reachable nodes within some known 
networks for which special routing instructions are given. The 
third rule covers the case of all other networks not known in 
advance, yet reachable through a series of “hops” to default 
gateways. Though absolutely necessary, the fourth rules does 
not cover any special case. It only enforces the reasoning in 
such a way that the transitivity of the relevant relationships 
(object properties in the ontology describing the functioning of 
“hopping” through gateways) is properly taken into account 
by the reasoner [6].  
 The execution of the reasoning based on all the 
information within the Knowledge Base and the four SWRL 
rules, allows to produce the set of all pairs made of a network 
interface and the nodes it can reach (discovered by looking at 
every network interface of a node, its direct connections and 
the routing instructions given to the node it belongs to). Here 
we have all information needed to produce the reachability 
matrix (as it is at present stage, at layer 3 of the OSI model).  
 Last step to produce our output – the Reachability Matrix – 
for use on the part of the other components is to explicitly 
point out, for each network interface of any given node, the set 
of all and only the other nodes that it can reach. However, this 
is not properly speaking reasoning, since it is just retrieval of 
triples (the form in which data are declared in OWL), and it is 
achieved by firing some SPARQL [7] queries (actually 
embedded in the APIs [8] of the persistence environment that 
we adopt). Other similar queries retrieve the rest of 
information that is available in the Knowledge Base and is 
expected in the Reachability Matrix according to the output 
format. 
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